A key challenge within autonomous systems, which consist ofautonomous entities (human or machine), is to automatically evaluate the relevance of information thus enabling individual entities to dynamically control access (classify) to any information they possess. This is particularly important when decentralized information sharing is required, ensuring that only authorized entities have access to potentially sensitive information. A high-level model for representing information relevance (and classification) based upon context-aware computing and role based access control concepts is described in this introductory paper, with potential future work detailed.
Introduction
Since the famous early theory on cybernetics in [1] the chimera of developing autonomous systems has been sought. In reality only automation has been achieved with high-levels of autonomy still an esoteric aspiration. In recent years however significant strides have been taken in the development of truly autonomous systems, most of this work has been in the software domain, in the form of autonomous agents. Autonomous agency as described in [2] is a concept intending to shift software development from that of objectorientation and latterly component-ware to richer and more natural techniques.
Much work has been carried out in developing software architectures [3] , [4] , [5] to model autonomous agents capable of monitoring and controlling complex and distributed processes [6] . In [7] Jennings describes an implementation of a multi-agent system (MAS) in which autonomous software agents collaborate to achieve desired objectives which may be set by any controlling authority (human or machine). However the environments in which autonomous agents have so far been considered have been relatively constrained resulting in little emphasis on security issues, therefore this work aims to build on previous research by taking information security issues into consideration, which is essential for the military application of autonomous systems. It must be noted that communications and storage as well as system state trust are also major electronic security issues; however they are not explicitly considered in this paper.
So far autonomy has been defined and studied using two distinctive approaches in the autonomous systems and agents research communities. Firstly it has been defined as the degree of self-control an entity has over its own decisions, which is assigned by a higher-level authority, e.g. a supervisor (human or machine), we call this decision autonomy. Decision autonomy is a satisfactory concept when considering autonomous entities in closed environments. However as the operational environment becomes more uncertain (real-life) then an additional understanding of autonomy with respect to its self-capability is required as described in [8] , we call this self-capability autonomy.
This latter approach is an assessment of an autonomous entities ability, to accomplish its assigned mission objectives with minimal external co-operative intervention.
Evolving Organizational Structure The deployment of machine autonomous entities in various military scenarios could be to supplement current human activities for specialist or broader task completion. In the near term it is envisaged that machine autonomous entities will operate under the direct control of human commanders, completing specific tasks in a well constrained manner. However as the machine autonomous entity becomes more advanced it may be used at different levels of the command hierarchy giving rise to a military structure which consists of fully interoperable and cooperating human and machine entities capable of fulfilling the required goal(s) as an effective team; this is illustrated in figure 1 . Such an architecture will encompass: machine to machine (M2M), human to machine (H2M) and human to human (H2H) interactions, where machines are capable of dynamically adapting according to the specifics of the current and projected environment. This capability is known as a self-healing architecture [9] , enabling machines to adjust their role(s) and task execution analogous to human operatives, in the event of a breakdown in the current command structure.
Due to the remote-controlled nature of current autonomous entities such as unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) the requirement to exchange information with entities other than the ground control station (centralized) is not prevalent, however as autonomous entities are assigned more decision autonomy then the communications will become less constrained giving rise to complex (decentralized) interactions. It is imperative to identify the relevance of information eliminating any unnecessary overheads introduced by the current system-high security approach. System-high security associates a static and monolithic relevance to all information in-line with the overall mission. However this can result in: Inappropriate information exchanges, where all entities within an operation may exchange either all or no information, violating the security principle of least-privileges or the key requirement for efficient information sharing.
Information Sharing
Currently in the military organization information sharing is achieved through a mixture of human and machine elements. In this arrangement machines are used to store and transmit raw data, whilst authorized human entities subjectively filter (process) and disseminate such data to other human entities providing situational awareness (SA) based upon their current operational context. Such a human filtering process preserves the information security principle of leastprivileges, as well as ensuring that recipient entities are not overloaded with information, which could degrade their performance.
The UK MoD concept of network enabled capability (NEC) which is also endorsed by the wider NATO community as network centric operations2 (NCO) advocates the use of ubiquitous computing and communications throughout the military organization, this is aimed at improving operational effectiveness through efficient information sharing (horizontally and vertically). In order to maintain efficiency in information sharing one must devise information processing techniques capable of providing the right information to the right entity at the right time, which has also been described by the US DoD [10] as providing only relevant information to entities in the battlespace. Such a requirement is unlikely to be served through the use of manual processes for information processing which would introduce significant bottlenecks (time and accuracy) into the information sharing process ultimately reducing the potential effectiveness of operations. The use of machine autonomous entities at various levels within the command chain will further exacerbate the need for an automated information filtering technique enabling machine-real-time operations.
Any automated filtering technique must be capable of taking into consideration the current operational context of an entity in order to identify the subset of information it requires. This is equivalent to the human information filtering and dissemination process described previously. In order to achieve such intelligent machine processing semantic information is required to allow for a machine to consistently differentiate between information sets according to context as described by Kimber [11] . The concept of context-aware computing (or location-based services) [12] , [13] , [14] can be seen to tackle similar issues.
The fundamental aim of context-aware computing is to push/pull relevant information services to entities based upon their perceived current context, this aids in lowering overheads in communications, CPU usage, battery power and most importantly information overload. From a security point-of-view one may extend traditional access control mechanisms such as RBAC to constrain the flow of information to individual entities based upon the current context in which a specific entity is operating thus preserving the principle of least-privileges, this was first considered by Zhang and Parashar in [15] . The majority of location-based services use location and time as the two principal attributes to evaluate the relevance of specific services to a given entity. Both of the aforementioned attributes may be used in conjunction with a third dimension of operational risk to identify the authorization a given entity may have in relation to some information service in a given operational threat environment.
Relative Information Classification
The model depicted in figure 2 highlights the principal metrics, which are proposed to distinguish relevant military SA information for a given subject. The time axis relates to the period over which a given piece of information is valid -therefore although a particular service may be capable of providing the planned location of logistics drop off points for the next two days, only such information for the next three hours may currently be of relevance; the space axis relates to the geographical zone over which a given piece of information is valid -therefore although a particular service may be capable of providing the location of all friendly and foe entities in the complete battlespace, only such information for a 500m3 zone may currently be of relevance. It is proposed to use a third attribute of risk to determine the perceived threat level associated with executing a given service and ultimately control access to information sharing, where risk is a function of the temporal and spatial validity of information provided by a given service as described previously as well as known friendly and adversary capabilities. This model for preserving the security of information services is called 'relative information classification', as information is no longer perceived to have a static and universal relevance for all entities; instead the same subject may have a differing need-to-know (or access rights) over the same piece of information according to its current role and location in temporal and geographical space. In order to achieve a relative classification system, entities will have temporal and geographical location (origin in figure 2 ) attributes from which information relevance and therefore access control decisions will be derived. These attributes will be based upon the current time and location of the entity or some other pre-authorized time and location within which a given entity is to carry out a mission. Relevant information will then be identified based upon the role an entity is currently fulfilling, as each role has associated maximum time (past and/or future) and space windows for which a given information service may be accessed. A maximum tolerated residual risk value will be associated with an individual or groups of service, similar to that currently calculated for UK government information technology (IT) systems using HMG infosec standard 1 [16] . The attributes which will be used to evaluate the level of risk associated with a specific information exchange are currently under investigation, they will incorporate the significance of the information exchange to friendly and foe entities, and the ability of foe entities to successfully exploit that information according to the communications environment e.g. high-grade/standard crypto, known adversary passive/active eavesdropping ability.
A privilege derived according to the three metrics of time, space and risk for a particular service is called an authorization state this enables the exchange of relevant (context-aware) information. Based upon the movement of a given entity its authorization state(s) may also be automatically updated adding and revoking rights automatically. A trusted mechanism is also required to provide authentic context attributes of time, space and risk. One such mechanism is the toolkit developed by Dey and Abowd [17] which was subsequently used in [ 15] .
A criticism of using an approach such as authorization states for a particular location in space. A1 then requests authentication credentials (e.g. digital certificates signed by a mutually trusted higherlevel commander) from A2 to prove its identity and role, after A2 has proved possession of the necessary credentials both A1 and A2 assess the risk level associated with the current environment for each service, and if the risk level is below the maximum threshold for each service A1 will provide A2 with the information it is deemed to be authorized to access. An example overview of how authorization states may be used to restrict the exchange of information to only that which is relevant and authorized is illustrated in figure 2 as the 'sharable information' (available informationrn authorized information) region which is the intersect of the 'available information' and 'authorized information'. It must be noted that if the risk level calculated by the communicating parties (e.g. A1 and A2) is greater than the maximum tolerated for the service in question (e.g.foe_foc) then execution of that service is prohibited. Figure 3 further highlights the case where an extended situational picture (high-level of sensitivity) is available as part of some service, however an entity may posses an authorization state3 which allows access to only a subset of this information as indicated by the dofted line. Conclusions We have identified and described the information security implications of autonomous systems, which it is need to be addressed. A clear distinction has been made between two forms of autonomy: decision and self-capability, which have previously been used interchangeably throughout the literature. Information security issues surrounding the need for automated and dynamic classification of information hosted by machine autonomous entities have also been identified as a key requirement. It is believed such a capability would enable efficient information sharing whilst preserving the security principle of leastprivileges (or need-to-know) in a decentralized communications architecture.
